Miller brewing licensing

Monfort, Inc. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. See City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co. United Airlines, Inc. Metz Group, F. The following factors are to be considered in evaluating standing:. Reazin, F. Contractors of California, Inc. California State Council of Carpenters, U. Because standing does not exist absent antitrust injury, I review the sufficiency of Coors' Complaint on this threshold issue first.

This definition reflects a fundamental principle in antitrust law that an injury, even if causally related to an antitrust violation, will not qualify as an "antitrust injury" unless it is attributable to an anticompetitive aspect of the practice under scrutiny. Atlantic Richfield Co. USA Petroleum Co. Cargill, U. Where the challenged conduct is a merger or acquisition, this standard requires plaintiff to prove injury flowing from the anticompetitive or predatory nature of the merger or the post-merger entity.

Brunswick, U. Coors' "injury," they argue, would be the result not of anticompetitive conduct or anticompetitive acts made possible by such conduct, but of "tough" competition. Miller Mem. Dismiss at 3. Defendants contend that under these circumstances, Coors is asking this court to protect a competitor, not competition, which is the "inimical" result against which the Supreme Court has cautioned.

To support their conclusion, defendants cite a case in which an earlier antitrust challenge to the Miller-Molson USA transaction was rejected on the same grounds. See Pearl Brewing Co. Miller Brewing Co. Coors disputes Pearl applies in this case because the Alliance, viewed in light of the Coors-Molson Licensing Agreement, is anti-competitive on its face.

Coors maintains the post-acquisition Miller-Molson combination by definition restrains Coors' competitive behavior, "automatically" lessening competition in the North American beer market. According to Coors, Pearl is distinguishable because the antitrust challenge was brought by brewing companies that, unlike Coors, had no contractual relationship with the entity their competitor was acquiring.

Dismiss at 29 n. It is this contractual relationship, Coors argues, that Miller is leveraging in this case to restrain trade, and which transforms Miller's "tough competition" into anticompetitive conduct causing antitrust injury to Coors.

The parties' logomachy reduces to opposite views on an ultimate issue in this case, viz, whether the post-acquisition Miller-Molson Alliance has injured Coors in a way the antitrust laws were designed to prevent. Coors' Complaint must stand or fall on the question of whether it has asserted factual allegations that, if proved, tend to establish an injury that flows from a threatened or actual restraint on competition.

See, e. Burger King Corp. While Coors' theory in this regard is less than clear, I find Coors has pleaded sufficient factual allegations to survive the present motion to dismiss. The Tenth Circuit's opinion on Molson's interlocutory appeal of Judge Matsch's denial of Molson's motion for stay, supports this conclusion.

If Coors is unable during discovery to marshall those facts, defendants no doubt will renew their challenge to the sufficiency of Coors' claims and the issue will be revisited on a motion for summary judgment. Even if Coors is found to have adequately alleged antitrust injury, Miller and Molson argue Coors lacks standing to pursue a claim for treble damages because the injury Coors alleges is based on "sheer speculation" as to harm Coors "might hypothetically" suffer in the future.

This argument is not without merit. As I review the record, I find few allegations that the Alliance has resulted in actual harm to Coors. The gist of Coors' Clayton Act claim for damages is that the Alliance's effect "may be substantially to lessen competition in the United States [and North American] beer market[s]. Again, however, I am reluctant to dismiss Coors' claim without first giving it an opportunity to develop and refine its theory of antitrust injury.

In its Complaint, Coors alleges the Alliance threatens to preclude it from implementing unified competitive strategies in the North American market except at the mercy of Miller and Molson, and alleges this threat has had a "current tangible impact" on its operations.

Coors' Mem. Coors asserts it has been forced to make choices, investments and plans it would not otherwise have made in order to protect itself from the threat it perceives is presented by the Alliance.

These assertions, if true, create an inference that Coors has suffered actual harm from the allegedly anticompetitive conduct of Miller and Molson. I also find Coors has satisfied the other factors to be considered in an evaluation of antitrust standing. Coors has alleged a causal connection between its injuries and the defendants' allegedly anticompetitive conduct, and has alleged facts from which anticompetitive intent can be inferred.

See n. Given the unique factual underpinnings of Coors' claims and the limited number of parties involved, there appears to be little risk of duplicative recoveries or the need for complex damages apportionment as would militate against conferring standing in this case.

Under these circumstances, I find Coors has satisfied the requirements articulated in Cargill and deny defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of standing.

Finally, defendants assert Coors' Complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Because antitrust standing cannot be established without antitrust injury, Sharp v. United Airlines, F. Again, if Coors is unable during discovery to marshall facts to support its theory of antitrust injury, defendants will be free to renew their challenge. No further comment on the question of antitrust injury is required. For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of standing and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, in which all defendants join, is DENIED, and the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, in which the Canadian Molson defendants join, is also DENIED.

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Miller Brewing Co. All six received credit terms from Miller; five were provided credit terms of net eleven days i. The six wholesalers are not in competition with each other insofar as each distributes Miller products in an exclusive distribution territory in Massachusetts granted it by Miller. Under the terms of that contract, alcoholic beverages sold by Miller to this ship chandler were shipped free on board F. The ship chandler transported the product into Massachusetts "for.

The contract provided, inter alia, that all such sales "shall be for export, used at ships stores or for resale aboard ships after departure from the United States," and that the ship chandler "represents and warrants that it will not sell any such beer. As to its sales to the ship chandler, Miller maintains that the statutory scheme set forth in c.

We review the commission's decision pursuant to G. Alcoholic Bevs. Control Commn. While in our review we give due deference to the agency's expertise, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and discretionary authority in administering the statute, see ibid. Section 25A: price discrimination. The commission maintains that the terms of credit that are extended to a buyer can reasonably be viewed as a component of the amount paid by the buyer and received by the seller.

While acknowledging that no Massachusetts appellate decision is controlling on this point, it suggests both that the definition of price in M. We agree both that M.

Thus, credit terms must be characterized as an inseparable part of the price. Target Sales, Inc. That credit terms may reasonably be viewed as a component of price is not, however, the end of the matter. Questions remain, first, as to whether the act of offering disparate credit terms, without more i. While such matters are of undoubted import in determining whether price discrimination in violation of Federal antitrust laws has occurred, see, e.

Sun Oil Co. Kline, Inc. Lorillard, Inc.